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INTRODUCTION 
With the current climate of ever-escalating salaries for 
professional athletes in the major sports, especially in the 
National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball 
Association (NBA),1 athlete’s agents are increasingly willing 
to bend or break National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) rules to sign the next big star.  As a result, the NCAA 
has resorted to increasingly harsh penalties for schools where 
violations occur.  Examples of this can be found at the 
University of Alabama (“Alabama”) in the 1990s and early 
2000s as well as at the University of Southern California 
(“USC”) in 2010.  Due to Alabama’s rules violations in 2002, 
the NCAA placed Alabama’s football program on probation, 
required it to reduce its number of scholarships, and 
prohibited it from playing in bowl games for two years.2  
These penalties made Alabama’s football program less 
competitive for years and cost Alabama arguably millions of 
dollars in lost ticket sales, goodwill and alumni donations, 
and advertising and television revenue.  Similar consequences 
are being projected for the football program at USC.3  With 
 
* For a look at escalation of median salaries in both the NFL and NBA, as well as in 
Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League, one can consult the USA 
Today Salary Database. USA Today Salaries Databases, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2010, 
8:56 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/salaries/default.aspx; USA 
Today Salaries Databases, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2010, 8:55 PM), 
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/default.aspx?Loc=Vanity.  For 
instance, in 2000 the highest median team salary in the NFL was the Detroit Lions’ 
$619,050 while the highest median team salary in the NFL in 2009 was the San 
Francisco 49ers’ $1,325,000. 
 2.  John Zenor, NCAA rolls Crimson Tide for Violations, USA Today, Feb. 1, 2002, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2002-02-01-alabama-violations.htm 
 3.  See Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Sports Receive Harsh Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/sports/ncaafootball/11usc.html (discussing 
the NCAA violations and noting that the resulting penalties will be a significant 
setback); Zach Rosenfield, Impact of USC’s NCAA Violations, ACCUSCORE, June 10, 
2010, http://accuscore.com/impact-of-uscs-ncaa-violations (asserting the real effect of 
the penalties comes from the loss of scholarships and will not be felt until after the 
post-season ban is lifted).  Interestingly, USC is taking advantage of a loophole to 
postpone the effects of the NCAA’s sanctions. See Stewart Mandel, Kiffin skirting 
recruiting sanctions as USC continues appeals process, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 28, 
2011, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/stewart_mandel/01/24/usc.recruiting 
/index.html.  If a school appeals its penalties, they are stayed while the appeal is 
ongoing. Id.  Thus, since USC appealed the NCAA’s sanctions and had not received a 
decision by the national signing day, USC was able to ignore the scholarship reduction 
and sign a full class of student-athletes. Id.  If USC’s appeal is denied, the full penalties 
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such severe penalties, one would expect schools to crack down 
on violations by agents and athletes, but high-profile 
violations continue to occur.4 
There have been calls for more regulation of the agent 
industry,5 action from the professional players’ unions barring 
violating agents from representing members,6 and even an 
end to amateur status for NCAA athletes,7 but, while all of 
those solutions may work in theory, the adoption and 
implementation of any of them is completely impractical.  
Rather, the tools for preventing such conduct have already 
been placed in the hands of the affected schools, waiting for a 
chance to be used.  With the passage of the Uniform Athlete 
Agent Act (“UAAA”) at the state level and the Sports Agent 
Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”) at the federal level, 
a school can bring a civil suit against any agents who cause it 
damage.8 
Accordingly, this Comment will argue that to prevent 
future NCAA rule violations by agents, schools should bring a 
civil suit against any agent that causes the school damage.  
Part I of this Comment will look at the current climate 
surrounding amateur athlete-agent relations including 
overviews of the NCAA, the sports agent industry, and early 
cases and legislation.  Special emphasis will be placed on the 
passage and contents of the UAAA and SPARTA.  Part II will 
 
will be applied from the date of the decision going forward. Id. 
 4.  See Jim Calhoun to be suspended in 2011-12, ESPN, Feb. 23, 2011, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=6146656 (discussing the rules violations at 
the University of Connecticut and the subsequent penalization of its men’s basketball 
program). 
 5. See Eric Willenbacher, Note, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal 
And State Efforts Do Not Deter The Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent And How A National 
Licensing System May Cure The Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225 (2004) (asserting 
that regulation of a new national licensing system would prevent agents from violating 
NCAA rules). 
 6.  See Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and 
Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781 (2006) (discussing players 
associations regulations and powers to sanction agents as possible ways to deter agents 
from violating NCAA rules) 
 7.  Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, The History Behind Athlete Agent Regulation And 
The “Slam Dunking of Statutory Hurdles”, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67 (2001) 
(proposing that the NCAA’s insistence on preserving amateur status may no longer be 
realistic or desirable). 
 8.  UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16 (2000); Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7805 (2004). 
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then consider previously proffered solutions, specifically, calls 
for more regulation, eliminating the amateur status 
requirement, and the intervention by professional players’ 
unions.  After considering these previously proffered 
solutions, Part III will assert that the best solution to the 
problem is civil suits brought by the harmed schools against 
the violating agents.  This section will consider both statutory 
and common law actions that schools may bring as well as 
address potential concerns and the viability of this solution.  
Part IV will then discuss other parties who may have claims 
against violating agents, which may serve as a supplement to 
any claims that schools may bring.   Part V concludes the 
Comment. 
BACKGROUND OF AMATEUR ATHLETE-AGENT RELATIONS 
Amateur athlete-agent relations are complex in that they 
affect numerous parties outside the immediate relationship.  
Not only do you have the athlete and the agent involved, but 
you also have the NCAA, the agent industry, legislators, and 
even the courts as part of the complete picture.  Thus, in order 
to gain a full understanding of amateur athlete-agent 
relations, one needs to understand each party’s role. 
The NCAA 
The NCAA was founded in 1906 due to concerns over 
dangerous athletic practices, particularly those in football.9  
After decades of success and expansion, in 1973, the NCAA 
divided into its present three-division format and, in 1980, the 
NCAA began overseeing women’s collegiate sports.10  Because 
of its continued expansion and the increased difficulties it had 
to contend with, the NCAA began establishing commissions 
starting with the President’s Commission in 1984.11  
Presidents from schools belonging to the NCAA’s three 
divisions compose these commissions and develop solutions to 
 
 9.  History, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Sept. 17, 2010, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+
the+ncaa+history.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  The President’s Commission was charged with setting the NCAA’s agenda 
and was composed of university presidents from each of the three divisions. Id. 
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unique and specific problems confronting the NCAA.12  Also 
introduced by the NCAA in 1984, the Professional Sports 
Counseling Panel was created to provide student athletes 
with competent advice regarding their futures without 
putting their amateur status at risk.13  But, this panel never 
became widely used.14 
The development of the Professional Sports Counseling 
Panel at such an early stage of the NCAA’s development of 
commissions highlights the significance the NCAA places on 
keeping collegiate athletics separate from professional sports.  
The principle of amateurism is addressed in article two of the 
NCAA constitution: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and 
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and 
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.15 
Article 12 of the NCAA Division I Manual provides further 
guidance on the principle of amateurism.16  Only amateur 
athletes are allowed to participate in intercollegiate athletics 
and athletic programs are designed to be part of educational 
programs.17  In addition to an athlete being automatically 
ineligible if they ever compete on a professional team, athletes 
become ineligible if they agree to be represented by an agent, 
even if the retention of the agent is for future negotiations.18  
Further, athletes will be deemed ineligible if they, their 
relatives, or their friends ever accept transportation or 
benefits from an agent.19 
 
 12.  One such commission, the Knight Commission, issued a report in 2010 
addressing fiscal transparency and academic accountability. See Gary Brown, NCAA 
backs Knight Commission’s reform principles, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION, June 17, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_ 
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/NCAA+News/NCAA+News+Online/2010/Associatio
n-wide/NCAA+backs+Knight+Commissions+reform+principles+NCAA+News.  
 13.  Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 10.14[2][b] (2009) 
[hereinafter Bender]. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  NCAA CONST. art. II 
 16.  NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL 65-80 (AUG. 1, 2010). 
 17.  Id. at 65. 
 18.  Id. at 71, 73. 
 19.  Id. 
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The Sports Agent Industry 
The nature of the sports agent industry, where the priority 
is to gain high-profile clients at any cost, is also a primary 
cause of the problems addressed in this Comment.  The public 
perception of the sports agent market is that it is 
overcrowded, and that is certainly true. One reason for the 
surplus of agents is that it is so easy to become one.  Former 
agent, Josh Luchs (“Luchs”), has said that all it took to 
become an NFL agent in 1988 was filling out some paperwork 
and paying a registration fee of approximately three hundred 
dollars.20  While some substance has been added to those 
requirements, one would still certainly not classify them as 
onerous.  The current requirements to become an agent 
registered with the NFL Players Association are (1) an 
application fee of $1,650, (2) undergraduate and post 
graduate degrees,21 (3) a background check, (4) attendance at 
a two day seminar, (5) completion of a proctored examination, 
and (6) a valid email address.22  One is able to begin 
representing players upon passage of the examination and the 
purchase of liability insurance.23 
As a result of the ease with which one can become an 
agent and the consequential market overcrowding, agents’ 
competition for clients has become fierce, with some willing to 
go to any lengths to gain a client.  Often, the agents act in 
contravention of NCAA rules by paying athletes or providing 
them with other benefits in order to entice them to sign an 
agent agreement.24  Corey Sawyer, a former football player at 
Florida State University (“Florida State”), confirmed this 
assertion, admitting to going on an agent-funded shopping 
spree at Foot Locker while still playing at Florida State.25  
 
 20.  George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 12, 
2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html?eref=sihp.  
 21.  The postgraduate degree can be either a master’s or law degree. Agent 
Regulations, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/Rules—
Regulations/Agent-Regulations/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Agent Certification FAQs, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/FAQs/Agent-Certification-FAQs/ (last visited Oct. 
27, 2010). 
 24.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1229-32. 
 25.  Sonja Steptoe & E.M. Smith, Anatomy Of A Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
May 16, 1994, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1005183/ 
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Luchs also confirmed the assertion and admitted to paying 
players as a way to establish a client list and break into the 
industry.26 
Luchs’ method of paying players consisted of giving 
players small monthly payments, instead of large lump sums, 
in order to make the player stay in contact with him.27  The 
use of this method partly explains why many schools and 
coaches have a hard time determining if a player is being paid 
by or receiving benefits from an agent.  If a player showed up 
to practice in a brand new Mercedes Benz, the coach would 
suspect something, but if a player is receiving enough to buy 
video games and pizza on the weekends, there is likely no way 
for someone to discover wrongdoing.  Thus, the current sports 
agent market can best be classified as overcrowded, fiercely 
competitive, and filled with people who know how to bend and 
break the rules without being detected. 
Making matters worse, there is an attitude of disdain 
toward the NCAA among some, if not most, sports agents.  As 
former agent, Mike Trope, once said: 
The NCAA rules are not the laws of the United States.  They're 
simply a bunch of hypocritical and unworkable rules set up by the 
NCAA.  As an agent, I absolutely was not bound by them.  NCAA 
rules are meaningless.  The coaches themselves, the people who are 
supposed to be bound by them, don't abide by them either.  Hell, 
nobody follows the NCAA rules.28 
Thus, because of the lack of any real sanction mechanism 
and the seeming lack of respect by agents, any further 
attempt by the NCAA to regulate the sports agent industry 
would likely be similarly unsuccessful, necessitating action to 
be taken by other parties. 
 
index.htm.  In addition to attending the shopping spree at Footlocker with at least six 
of his teammates, Sawyer and at least five other Florida State football players accepted 
cash and other benefits totaling nearly $60,000 from Raul Bey and his “bird dog” Nate 
Cebrun. Id.  Eventually, Bey and Cebrun were found guilty of failing to register with 
Florida as sports agents. See Jack McCallum & Richard O’Brien, Scorecard July 15, 
1996, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 15, 1996, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/ 
article/magazine/MAG1008373/index.htm.  Bey was fined $12,000 and sentenced to one 
year in jail while Cebrun was fined $2,000 and sentenced to thirty days in jail. Id.  For 
its part in the scandal, the NCAA placed Florida State on probation for one year for 
failing to monitor the activities of agents. Id. 
 26.  Dohrmann, supra note 20. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Bender, supra note 13, § 10.14[2][d]. 
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Early Cases Against Sports Agents 
Due to the nature of the sports agent industry causing 
unscrupulous agents to break NCAA rules to sign athletes, 
the NCAA was forced to penalize the athletes and schools that 
played a part in the violations.  Because the schools and 
athletes had no real recourse at that time, prosecutors 
attempted to deter future incidents by going after some such 
agents.29  This was the motivation behind such cases as 
Abernathy v. State (“Abernathy”),30 United States v.  Walters 
(“Walters”),31 and United States v. Piggie (“Piggie”).32  But, the 
legal frameworks under which these cases were argued were 
ill-suited towards prohibiting the targeted behavior. 
Criminal Cases 
In Abernathy,33 a former sports agent entered into a 
contract with a college football player who continued to play 
for the university in violation of NCAA rules.  The agent was 
charged under Alabama law with commercial bribery, 
unlawful trade practice, and tampering with a sports contest.  
After trial, a jury acquitted him of the first two charges, 
which were poor fits because entering into a contract with an 
athlete is not illegal.  But, the jury found him guilty of 
tampering with a sports contest and Abernathy was 
sentenced to one year of imprisonment and fined $2,000.34  On 
appeal, the court reversed the conviction, finding that 
Abernathy did not possess the requisite intent.35  The court 
stated that a conviction for tampering with a sports contest 
required the intent to influence the outcome.36  The court 
found that Abernathy’s intent, at worst, was for Auburn to 
play with an ineligible player and, thus, Abernathy did not 
 
 29.  Prosecutors had an interest in these early cases against agents because most of 
the schools affected by the NCAA sanctions were state institutions such as Auburn 
University; the University of California, Los Angeles; the University of Missouri; and 
Oklahoma State University. 
 30.  Abernathy v. State, 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). 
 31.  United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 32.  United States v. Piggie, 303 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 33.  Abernathy, 545 So.2d at 186. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 191. 
 36.  Id. at 188. 
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have criminal intent and the conviction warranted reversal.37  
Beyond this reason, however, the court determined, “The 
fundamental reason why Abernethy's conviction must be 
reversed is because the crime of tampering with a sports 
contest was obviously not intended to and does not, embrace 
the agent contract type of situation involved in this case.”38  
The court gives the impression that this law is also not a good 
fit for situations involving typical agent agreements.39 
Similarly, in Walters,40 an agent provided student-athletes 
with money and cars in exchange for their signing a 
representation agreement with him, which he post-dated and 
promised to keep secret until the athletes’ collegiate careers 
were over.  But, when it came time for the athletes to acquire 
agents, many signed with other agents and kept the money 
and cars from Walters.41  After becoming frustrated, Walters 
threatened to break one of the athlete’s legs unless the athlete 
repaid Walters’ firm and federal prosecutors charged him 
with conspiracy, RICO violations for extortion, and mail 
fraud.42  Walters agreed to enter a conditional Alford plea, 
preserving his right to contest the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him, and plead guilty to mail fraud while the 
prosecutor dismissed the conspiracy and RICO charges.43  The 
prosecutor argued that Walters was guilty of mail fraud 
because his scheme defrauded the schools of property, the 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 190. 
 39.  As an interesting side note, the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 
1987 came into effect the same day Abernathy entered into the agreement with the 
student-athlete. Abernathy, 545 So.2d at 190.  But, that act did not prohibit or make 
illegal entering into a sports contract with a student-athlete and prosecutors did not 
charge Abernathy under it. Id.  The court did not consider whether Abernathy violated 
any provision of that act, but the prosecution’s failure to bring any charge under it may 
indicate that entering into a sports contract with a student-athlete was actually not 
prohibited under it. 
 40.  Walters, 997 F.2d 1219.  For an excellent discussion of Walters, see generally 
Landis Cox, Note, Targeting Sports Agents With The Mail Fraud Statute: United States 
v. Norby Walters & Lloyd Bloom, 41 DUKE L.J. 1157 (April 1992).  The note provides an 
in-depth examination of the trial, focusing on the four major parties relevant to the 
case: the agents, the student-athletes, the school, and the NCAA. Id. at 1160-90.  The 
note also looks at how the mail fraud statute was stretched to its limits by the 
government’s theory and provides policy considerations weighing against application of 
the statute. Id. at 1190-1209. 
 41.  Walters, 997 F.2d at 1221. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1221-22. 
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scholarships wrongfully given to the ineligible athletes, -
through use of the mail, since the schools mailed falsified 
eligibility forms to the NCAA.44  The court disagreed with the 
prosecution because the use of the mail was not foreseeable by 
Walters and he had not sought to obtain property from the 
schools, only from the athletes in the future.45  Accordingly, 
the court held that “only a scheme to obtain money or other 
property from the victim by fraud,” would sustain a conviction 
for mail fraud.46  Once again, the courts were unwilling to 
stretch existing statutes to cover this type of agent behavior. 
Conversely, in Piggie,47 the Eighth Circuit found that the 
federal mail and wire fraud statute was applicable.  There, 
defendant Piggie ran a traveling Amateur American Union 
(“AAU”) basketball team and devised a scheme to attract top 
high school players to his team by paying them.48  Four of the 
athletes Piggie paid committed to play college basketball at 
various schools and used the U.S. Postal Service to deliver 
their signed letters of intent, which falsely asserted their 
eligibility.  When Piggie’s payments to the athletes were 
discovered, the NCAA penalized all the athletes, their 
colleges, and their high schools.49  Consequently, Piggie plead 
guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and was 
sentenced to thirty-seven months in jail, three years of 
supervised release, and ordered to pay $324,279.87 in 
restitution.50  The court affirmed that Piggie’s scheme fell 
within the definition of mail and wire fraud because his 
actions deprived the schools of the services of the athletes, 
caused the schools loss of scholarships due to NCAA penalties, 
and forced the school to incur investigative and other costs.51  
But, the court made no mention of the use of the mail to 
perpetrate the fraud other than to state that the athletes 
mailed their letters of intent.52  The majority of the court’s 
opinion was focused on an analysis of the appropriate amount 
 
 44.  Id. at 1223-24. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1227. 
 47.  Piggie, 303 F.3d 923. 
 48.  Id. at 924. 
 49.  Id. at 924-26. 
 50.  Id. at 926. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 925. 
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of damages, which was ultimately determined to be the 
greater of actual or intended losses.53  This decision’s conflict 
with that reached in Walters exhibits the major concern with 
states’ regulation of agent behavior at that time:  the lack of 
uniformity between jurisdictions.  It was this unpredictability 
that eventually led to the UAAA’s promulgation. 
Civil Cases 
Actions against agents were not limited to the criminal 
law, but aggrieved parties did not bring many civil actions.  
Further, those that were initiated were settled without much 
publicity, eliminating any deterrent effect the litigation might 
have possessed.  An example of this is an action brought by 
USC against lawyer-agent, Robert Caron (“Caron”).  In 1995, 
Caron paid money and gave airline tickets and other items to 
three USC football players.54  The NCAA began an 
investigation into the transactions and USC decided to bring 
suit against Caron.  The suit alleged interference with 
contractual relationships and prospective business 
advantages.55  Before the case was litigated, however, Caron 
settled with USC, agreeing to pay $50,000.56  While this may 
not have been the first case where a school brought a civil 
action against an agent, the NCAA director of enforcement at 
that time, David Berst, did not believe such a suit had 
occurred before.57 Thus, the success in this case should have 
really started a trend for civil litigation as a solution to agent 
misconduct, but perhaps the lack of publicity that a trial 
would have generated prevented such a trend from starting. 
The UAAA 
In response to the concerns over jurisdictional uniformity 
as well as the need for significant reform of sports agent 
regulation, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
 
 53.  Piggie, 303 F.3d at 927. 
 54.  Elliott Almond, USC Will File Suit Against Agent Caron, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-06/sports/sp-53971_1_sports-agent.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 429 n. v (West ed., 
3d ed. 2004). 
 57.  Almond, supra note 54. 
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Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) developed the UAAA in 
2000.58  The NCCUSL’s purpose for the UAAA states: 
This act provides for the uniform registration, certification, and 
background check of sports agents seeking to represent student 
athletes who are or may be eligible to participate in intercollegiate 
sports. The act also imposes specified contract terms on these 
agreements to the benefit of student athletes, and provides 
educations institutions with a right to notice along with a civil 
cause of action for damages resulting from a breach of specified 
duties.59 
The UAAA has been adopted by forty states as well as the 
District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.60 
A major focus of the UAAA is sports agent registration.  
Under the UAAA, individuals may not act as agents unless 
they have registered with the appropriate state and if any 
person enters into an agent contract without being registered, 
that contract is void and any consideration received under it 
must be returned.61  The UAAA also provides the 
requirements to register as an agent,62 factors states may 
consider when deciding to approve a registration 
application,63 and the process for suspension or revocation of 
an individual’s registration.64  Further, the UAAA provides 
language that must be included in an agent contract,65 
requires notice of agent contracts to educational institutions,66 
and permits student athletes to cancel any agent contract 
within fourteen days of signing it.67  But, while all of the 
provisions mentioned to this point are significant, and 
necessary, the most important provisions of the UAAA 
 
 58.  A Few Facts About the Uniform Athlete Agent Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_ 
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aaa.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.; Athlete Agents Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 61.  UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 4. 
 62.  Id. § 5. 
 63.  Id. § 6. 
 64.  Id. § 7. 
 65.  Id. § 10. 
 66.  Id. § 11. 
 67.  UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 12. 
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provide a comprehensive list of prohibited conduct,68 criminal 
penalties,69 and civil remedies.70  Significantly, the civil 
remedies recoverable by a school may include “lost television 
revenues, lost ticket sales from regular season athletic events, 
lost revenues from not qualifying for postseason athletic 
events such as football bowl games and NCAA tournaments, 
and possibly the value of the athlete’s scholarship.”71 
SPARTA 
After the promulgation of the UAAA and the realization 
that existing federal law was insufficient to control agent 
misconduct, Congress passed SPARTA, which became law in 
2004.72 SPARTA is intended, “to designate certain conduct by 
sports agents relating to the signing of contracts with student 
athletes as unfair and deceptive acts or practices to be 
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.”73  It is not 
intended to displace state laws, but rather, to supplement 
them.74  But, in SPARTA, Congress encourages states to adopt 
the UAAA as it was promulgated by the NCCUSL in 2000,75 
further demonstrating the concern for jurisdictional 
uniformity. 
 
 68.  Id. § 14. “An athlete agent, with the intent to induce a student-athlete to enter 
into an agency contract, may not: (1) give any materially false or misleading 
information or make a materially false promise or representation; (2) furnish anything 
of value to a student-athlete before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract; 
or (3) furnish anything of value to any individual other than the student-athlete or 
another registered athlete agent.” Id. § 14(a)(1)-(3).  “An athlete agent may not 
intentionally: (1) initiate contact with a student-athlete unless registered under this 
[Act]; (2) refuse or fail to retain or permit inspection of the records required to be 
retained by Section 13; (3) fail to register when required by Section 4; (4) provide 
materially false or misleading information in an application for registration or renewal 
of registration; (5) predate or postdate an agency contract; or (6) fail to notify a student-
athlete before the student-athlete signs or otherwise authenticates an agency contract 
for a particular sport that the signing or authentication may make the student-athlete 
ineligible to participate as a student-athlete in that sport.” Id. § 14(b)(1)-(6). 
 69.  Id. § 15. 
 70.  Id. § 16. 
 71.  Weiler, supra note 56, at 429. 
 72.  15 U.S.C. § 7805; H.R. 361: Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-361 (last visited Oct. 
28, 2010). 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 7805. 
 74.  Id. § 7806. 
 75.  Id. § 7807. 
MILLS_REINVENT THE WHEEL 11/8/2012  6:55 PM 
2012] No Need to Reinvent the Wheel 359 
 
Unlike the UAAA, SPARTA does not focus on sports agent 
registration. SPARTA starts by providing the prohibited 
conduct and what the agent is required to disclose to the 
athlete.76 SPARTA next states that any violation will be 
treated as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
giving the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) the power to 
enforce it.77 SPARTA goes on to give state attorneys general 
the power to bring a civil action against any agent who causes 
harm to residents by violating SPARTA and to provide for the 
protection of the schools.78  While SPARTA has been criticized 
for not providing a stronger deterrent than already existed 
under federal law,79 this view overlooks the messages 
Congress sent through SPARTA.  First, Congress makes clear 
that this type of agent behavior is completely unacceptable, is 
taken seriously by the government, and will no longer be 
tolerated.  Second, Congress has sent a message to the FTC 
and state attorneys general that violations of SPARTA should 
not be overlooked and action should be taken whenever such 
violations occur.  Finally, Congress has made clear that, even 
if the FTC or attorneys general do not bring an action, 
whether for lack of resources or otherwise, violations of this 
act should not go unpunished and those harmed the most, the 
schools, should protect themselves through civil litigation. 
PREVIOUSLY PROFFERED SOLUTIONS 
Agents disregarding and breaking NCAA rules is not a 
new phenomenon,80 even if it does seem to get much more 
 
 76.  Id. § 7802. 
 77.  Id. § 7803. 
 78.  Id. §§ 7804, 7805. SPARTA provides for the protection of schools in two ways.  
First, agents are required to provide written notice to the person responsible for the 
school’s athletic programs within seventy two hours of entering into the contract or 
before the next sporting event, whichever comes first. Id. § 7805(a).  Second, schools 
have a right of action against agents for damages caused by violations of SPARTA. Id. § 
7805(b)(1).  Damages include actual losses sustained by schools due to a violation of 
SPARTA as well as those caused by penalties from the NCAA, conferences, or the 
institution itself. Id. § 7805(b)(2).  Significantly, prevailing schools may recover costs 
and attorneys’ fees and schools’ rights, remedies, and defenses under law or equity are 
not restricted by SPARTA. Id. §§ 7805 (b)(3), (4). 
 79.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1235. 
 80.  See Patrick Hruby, College football, agents go way back, ESPN, Oct. 21, 2010, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?id=5710346.  Hruby discusses 
two individuals, future NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle and the future owner of the 
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media coverage than in the past.  As a result, the NCAA and 
many others have tried to devise ways to force agents to 
comply with NCAA rules.  While, clearly, none have been 
entirely successful to this point, these ideas have laid the 
foundation for current legislation, like the UAAA and 
SPARTA, to put us within reach of an ultimate solution.  This 
section will explore three main solutions that have been 
offered as a way to reach that end point, but would ultimately 
be unsuccessful for various reasons. 
More Regulation of the Sports Agent Industry 
Despite the fairly recent passage of the UAAA in most 
states and SPARTA at the federal level, some individuals feel 
that more regulation is needed to solve the problem of agents 
breaking NCAA rules.81  Some call for regulation in the form 
of a national licensing or registration program for agents,82 
while others call for a requirement that agents possess a law 
degree, thus allowing the Bar to police this type of conduct.83  
Legislators in some states have also endorsed this solution.84  
To truly consider this option, however, one needs to look at 
the nature and enforcement of current regulations. 
Of the forty-two states that have passed sports agent laws, 
 
Tennessee Titans, Bud Adams, inducing Heisman Trophy winner Billy Cannon to sign 
contracts with them by providing him with unbelievable gifts.  Rozelle paid Cannon 
$10,500 to sign with him while Adams paid Cannon $20,000, gave him ownership of 
five gas stations, a half-interest in an oil company, and a Cadillac for his father. Id.  
While Rozelle and Adams were not agents, they still acted in contravention of NCAA 
rules, demonstrating that this type of behavior has existed for longer than many would 
imagine. 
 81.  See Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53; Oregon legislation would crack 
down on sports agents’ influence on college athletes, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 13, 2010, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/collegefootball/index.ssf/2010/10/oregon_legislation_would_c
rack.html. 
 82.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53. 
 83.  Stacey M. Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a Lawyer-
Representative Than An Agent?  Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 431 (1999). 
 84.  See Oregon legislation would crack down on sports agents’ influence on college 
athletes, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/collegefootball/ 
index.ssf/2010/10/oregon_legislation_would_crack.html.  Oregon has passed the UAAA, 
but Senator Courtney will propose to strengthen the statute by broadening the 
definition of sports agent, requiring agents to register with an official at each school 
they intend to contact student-athletes, protect athletes at elementary and high 
schools, and add a prohibition of providing benefits to athletes through friends or 
family. Id. 
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more than half have yet to invoke penalties of any sort on 
violating agents.85  Further, the FTC has received very few 
complaints about agents violating SPARTA and has not yet 
taken any enforcement actions.86  There are numerous 
reasons for this, but the primary ones seem to be a lack of 
resources,87 lack of priority by enforcement agencies,88 and a 
general belief that any actions will be useless as agents may 
simply move their activities to a different state.89  While the 
relative merits of these reasons may be questionable, their 
existence is not and there is no reason to believe that passing 
more regulations would eliminate them.  More regulations 
would not increase the amount of resources enforcement 
agencies are able to dedicate to pursuing actions against 
violating agents and would certainly not change the beliefs of 
those responsible for enforcing the laws. 
A more reasonable solution may be to simply tweak the 
existing statutes, such as adding a national sports agent 
registry requirement to SPARTA.90  But, even this solution 
overlooks the problems with SPARTA as it now exists.  The 
addition of a national sports agent registry requirement 
would not provide additional motivation to schools to report 
agents who violate SPARTA and would not increase the FTC’s 
ability or motivation to pursue actions against such agents.  
Schools, athletes, and agents know who the violating agents 
are, yet there have been very few complaints to the FTC and 
it has taken no enforcement actions.91  Further, identifying 
the violating agents will serve no purpose and will not deter 
agents from engaging in improper conduct. 
 
 85.  Alan Scher Zagier, Laws On Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/laws-on-sports-agents-
rar_n_685000.html.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Liz Proctor, spokeswoman for the North Carolina Secretary of State’s office, 
stated that when the UAAA was passed it came with no funding, so there were no 
resources dedicated for its enforcement. Id. 
 88. As an example, Kenneth Shropshire, director of the Wharton Sports Business 
Initiative at the University of Pennsylvania’s business school, has said, “If you’ve got 
bank robbers and rapists, white-collar crime – how many agent issues should be raised 
to the top of some prosecutor’s desk?” Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53. 
 91.  Zagier, supra note 85. 
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NCAA Elimination of its Amateurism Requirement 
The NCAA has received a lot of criticism for the 
preservation of its amateurism requirement in an era where 
its operating revenue equals $710 million.92  A particularly 
critical analysis of the NCAA’s stance on amateurism states 
that but for NCAA rules, an agent entering into a contract 
with a student-athlete for their future representation would 
not cause harm to the athlete or school.93  Also, the NCAA 
rules place states in a no-win situation where they have to sit 
by and allow athletes and schools to suffer harsh penalties or 
punish the agents who cause such penalties to occur.94  
Further, while the NCAA requires amateurism in an attempt 
to secure the integrity of competition, its integrity has already 
been compromised by the inherent unfairness of athletic 
rankings and recruiting.95  Lastly, the NCAA rules permit 
schools and coaches to take advantage of the student-athletes 
by parlaying the student-athlete’s successes into larger 
coaching contracts and increased financial resources for the 
schools.96 
But, aside from the extremely remote chance of the NCAA 
eliminating its amateurism requirement making this solution 
impractical, there are also valid responses to the criticisms.  
In response to the assertion that student-athletes should be 
paid because schools are generating revenues and the 
student-athletes are doing the work, the NCAA emphasizes 
that the revenues do not go to owners or shareholders, but to 
providing increased opportunities for all student-athletes.97  
Further, student-athletes are not university employees, but 
are among the fortunate few that are able to continue their 
 
 92.  Revised Budget for Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2010, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
6d3874004e51aadc96e0d622cf56f2f3/2009-10+Budget+Breakdown_ALL.pdf?MOD= 
AJPERES&CACHEID=6d3874004e51aadc96e0d622cf56f2f3.  
 93.  Sudia, supra note 7, at 76-77. 
 94.  Id. at 77-78. 
 95.  Id. at 79. 
 96.  Id. at 79-80. 
 97.  Behind the Blue Disk: Why Don’t You Pay Student-Athletes?, NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/Behind+the+Blue+Disk+-
+Why+Dont+You+Pay+Student-Athletes.  
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development in both sports and academics.98  To the 
contention that the schools are generating revenue and can 
easily afford to pay the student athletes, the NCAA responds 
that more than ninety percent of NCAA schools consistently 
lose money on their athletics programs and, in Division I, only 
thirty percent of football and twenty six percent of men’s 
basketball programs make money.99  Finally, in response to 
the notion that student-athletes are being exploited, the 
NCAA notes that most current and former student-athletes 
appreciate the educational and athletic opportunities that 
college presents, that student-athletes graduate at a higher 
rate than the general student body, and that the average full-
ride scholarship at a public school is worth more than 
$100,000, resulting in Division I and II institutions 
cumulatively awarding $1.5 billion in athletics scholarships 
each year.100 
Professional Players Associations Should Take A More Active 
Role in the Regulation of Agent Conduct 
Players associations are in a unique position to regulate 
agent conduct.  Without players association certification, 
agents cannot represent the member-athletes.101  
Consequently, players associations hold significant leverage 
to force agents to follow the players associations’ rules.  The 
main focuses of the players associations’ regulations are on 
agents’ competence and ethics and on competition between 
agents.102  Clearly, agents’ interactions with student-athletes 
fall into the latter category.  What has been seen as a positive 
attribute of players associations, and the NFL Players 
Association (“NFLPA”) in particular, is the willingness to 
amend its regulations to better protect its members’ 
interests.103  This has been demonstrated in the past,104 as 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Davis, supra note 6, at 816. 
 102.  Id. at 817-20. 
 103.  Id. at 820-26. 
 104.  In 2002, the NFLPA adopted a one-in-three rule, requiring agents to negotiate 
at least one contract every three years to remain certified, in order to reduce the 
number of agents in the market. Id. at 820.  Also, in 2004, the NFLPA amended its 
regulations to require agents to disclose all payments they make to runners. Id. at 820-
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well as the present, with the recent focus being on improper 
agent behavior.105  Due to players associations’ unique 
position of authority over agents and players associations’ 
willingness to amend their regulations when needed, some 
individuals have called for players associations to take action 
against agents who violate NCAA rules.106  This argument, 
however, ignores the fact that players associations’ main 
concerns are its members and that by entering into the 
conflict between agents and the NCAA, players associations 
may be acting in contravention of their members’ best 
interests. 
By suspending or, in an extreme case, banning an agent 
from representing its members due to improper conduct, 
players associations would be depriving members of their 
chosen representation.  Even if only one member of the 
players association would be forced to find new 
representation, this has historically been a major concern for 
the players associations,107 making it unlikely to occur.  
Further, former agent Luchs has stated that the NFLPA is 
undermanned to police agent behavior.108  Luchs has called 
the NFLPA’s regulations of agent conduct ineffective and 
stated that the NFLPA only pursues cases that fall into its 
lap.109  The lack of investigation and active pursuit of cases 
against agents who violate NCAA rules has long been the 
status quo and is not likely to change unless the NFLPA 
would receive something significant in exchange for changing 
its approach. Since the players associations’ main concern is 
the welfare and happiness of its members and the agents’ 
conduct is not directly harming the student-athletes, and 
future players association members, the players associations 
may not be too motivated to take action to change the agents’ 
conduct.  While student-athletes are unquestionably harmed 
 
21. 
 105.  NFLPA officials are part of a twenty-person panel considering solutions to the 
problem of agents improperly interacting with student-athletes. Joe Schad, Financial 
penalties for players possible, ESPN, Oct. 26, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
ncf/news/story?id=5725836.  
 106.  See Pat Forde, Josh Luchs’ story only helps agent issue, ESPN, Oct. 13, 2010, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde_pat&id=5681728.  
 107.  Davis, supra note 6, at 820-26. 
 108.  Interview by Mike Golic & Mike Greenberg with Josh Luchs, former sports 
agent, on ESPN Radio (Oct. 13, 2010). 
 109.  Id. 
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through NCAA penalties, student-athletes also benefit from 
agents providing them with money and gifts.  Thus, since the 
number of players association members who received such 
benefits without penalty is without question greater than 
those who were caught by the NCAA,110 players associations 
may view this type of agent behavior as having an overall 
positive effect for its members and be hesitant to prevent it in 
the future. 
SCHOOLS THAT ARE HARMED BY AN AGENT’S CONDUCT SHOULD 
BRING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST THE AGENT 
All of the aforementioned solutions, aside from being 
improbable, require further action by an entity as part of the 
solution.  But, these proffered solutions overlook the existence 
of a more moderate solution, for which the framework is 
already in place.  Both statutes and the common law support 
the option of schools bringing civil actions against agents who 
cause them harm.  Thus, there is no need for extensive 
overhauls of NCAA rules or the existing statutes and there is 
no further action needed by legislators or the NCAA before 
schools can solve the problem of agent misconduct. 
Statutory Civil Action 
The UAAA authorizes a civil action for schools against 
agents for damages caused by agent violations.111  The UAAA 
states that schools have a right of action against either agents 
or student-athletes who cause the school damages by violating 
the UAAA.112  Under the UAAA, damages may include losses 
schools suffer because of penalties from the NCAA or 
conferences, or self-imposed penalties, as well as those 
resulting from violations of the UAAA.113  As previously 
 
 110.  As an example of the large number of student-athletes who received benefits 
from agents without being caught, Josh Luchs claims to have paid at least thirty-three 
current and former NFL players and was never discovered by the NCAA or any other 
entity. Dohrmann, supra note 20.  Luchs was only recently decertified by the NFLPA, 
NFLPA decertifies Josh Luchs, ESPN, Oct. 21, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ 
story?id=5712065, demonstrating another instance of the NFLPA dealing with a case 
that fell into its lap. 
 111.  UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16. 
 112.  Id. § 16(a). 
 113.  Id. § 16(b). 
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mentioned, these losses may include, “lost television 
revenues, lost ticket sales from regular season athletic events, 
lost revenues from not qualifying for postseason athletic 
events such as football bowl games and NCAA tournaments, 
and possibly the value of the athlete’s scholarship.”114  The 
UAAA further states that rights of action do not accrue until 
the school has, or reasonably should have, discovered the 
violation and that liability in such a right of action is several, 
not joint.115  Thus, by providing a right of action for any 
damages caused by NCAA penalties and a wide range of 
recoverable damages, the UAAA envisions civil actions by 
schools as a major deterrent of improper agent conduct and, 
possibly, as the overall solution. 
Similarly, SPARTA provides schools with a right of action 
for any damages caused by violations thereof.116  This is 
significant due to the breadth of prohibited conduct under 
SPARTA, which includes directly, or indirectly, recruiting or 
soliciting a student-athlete to enter into a contract by giving 
any false or misleading information or making a false promise 
or representation.117  Further, an agent is prohibited from 
providing anything of value to a student-athlete or person 
associated with the student-athlete before entering into an 
agency contract, including any consideration in the form of a 
loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or co-guarantor 
for any debt.118  Finally, it is prohibited to enter into a 
contract with a student-athlete without providing them with 
the required disclosures,119 or to predate or postdate an 
agency contract.120  If an agent engages in any of the 
prohibited conduct under SPARTA or causes a school to be 
penalized by the NCAA, a conference, or itself, resulting in 
actual losses or expenses, then the school may recover those 
damages under SPARTA.121 SPARTA also allows a school to 
recover costs and reasonable attorney fees if it prevails in an 
 
 114.  Weiler, supra note 56, at 429. 
 115.  UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT §§ 16(c), (d). 
 116.  15 U.S.C. § 7805(b). 
 117.  Id. § 7802(a)(1)(A). 
 118.  Id. § 7802(a)(1)(B). 
 119.  Id. § 7802(a)(2). 
 120.  Id. § 7802(a)(3). 
 121.  Id. § 7805(b)(2). 
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action.122  This shows that Congress, as with the NCCUSL in 
its drafting and promotion of the UAAA, intended to 
encourage civil actions by schools as a primary means of 
combating agent misconduct. 
For those states that have not passed the UAAA, but have 
athlete agent legislation on the books, there are similarities 
with the UAAA and SPARTA.  An example of this is the law 
in California,123 which will be examined because of the 
number of high profile universities in that state and the 
recent NCAA rules violations at, and subsequent penalization 
of, USC.124  The California law is known as the Miller-Ayala 
Athlete Agents Act (“Miller-Ayala Act”),125 and is an excellent 
example of an overly complicated statute, whose goals would 
benefit from the simplicity and clarity of the UAAA.  The 
Miller-Ayala Act prohibits much the same behavior of the 
UAAA and SPARTA including postdating contracts and 
offering or providing money or other benefits to student-
athletes.126  Also, the Miller-Ayala Act requires agents to 
provide notice to the appropriate school when they enter into 
a contract with a student-athlete and provides for language 
that must be contained in every agent contract.127  The Miller-
Ayala Act states that schools may bring a civil action for 
recovery of damages from an agent if the school is adversely 
affected by the acts of the agent or their representative.128  
Schools are deemed adversely affected if they or one or more 
of their student-athletes are suspended or disqualified from 
competition by the NCAA or other regulatory entity.129  If a 
school is deemed to be adversely affected, then its recoverable 
damages include the greater of $50,000 or actual damages 
and it may also recover punitive damages, court costs, and 
reasonable attorneys fees.  Additionally, violating agents 
forfeit any right of repayment for benefits provided to 
student-athletes and must refund any consideration paid by 
 
 122.  15 U.S.C. § 7805(b)(3). 
 123.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895-97.97 (2004). 
 124.  See generally NCAA delivers postseason ban, ESPN, June 11, 2010, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615.  
 125.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895. 
 126.  Id. §§ 18897.5, 18897.6. 
 127.  Id. §§ 18897.7, 18897.73. 
 128.  Id. § 18897.8(a). 
 129.  Id. 
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the student-athlete or on behalf of the student-athlete.130  
Agents also face criminal penalties of up to one year in jail, a 
fine of up to $50,000, or both as well as the possible 
suspension or revocation of their ability to engage in the 
business of an athlete agent.131  Finally, in the Miller-Ayala 
Act, the legislature stated its intent to encourage enforcement 
of the Miller-Ayala Act through private civil actions.132  Thus, 
as with Congress and the legislatures of the states that have 
passed the UAAA, civil actions by schools against agents that 
cause those schools damage are meant to be the primary 
solution to the problem of improper agent conduct. 
Common Law Civil Action 
In addition to any statutory claims a school may bring 
against an agent that has caused the school damage, schools 
may also bring common law claims against such agents. 
SPARTA and the UAAA expressly state that they do not 
restrict the remedies under existing law or equity.133  Thus, 
based on current statutory language and the precedent of 
schools successfully bringing common law actions against 
agents that cause schools harm,134 any school that has a 
statutory civil right of action against an agent should also 
pursue common law claims. 
Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relation Claim 
It is well established that a contractual relationship exists 
between a school and its student-athletes.135  Thus, in a 
situation where a student-athlete has breached its contract 
with a school by entering into a contract with an agent and 
losing NCAA eligibility, the school will have a claim for 
tortious interference because, “one who intentionally and 
improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
 
 130.  Id. § 18897.8(b). 
 131.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.93. 
 132.  Id. § 18897.8(c). 
 133.  15 U.S.C. § 7806; UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16(e). 
 134.  The claims in USC’s suit against Caron were interference with contractual 
relationships and prospective business advantages. Almond, supra note 54. 
 135.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C. App. 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); 
Williams v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 112 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. Claims 2001); 
Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 2003). 
MILLS_REINVENT THE WHEEL 11/8/2012  6:55 PM 
2012] No Need to Reinvent the Wheel 369 
 
(except a contract to marry) between another and a third 
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not 
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for 
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of 
the third person to perform the contract.”136  The elements of a 
claim for tortious interference with a contract are that the 
conduct is intentional, the conduct interferes with the 
contract, the defendant knew of the existence of the contract, 
and the plaintiff suffered damages.137  The first three 
elements are easily satisfied in any situation where an agent 
signs a student-athlete to a contract, but the damages 
element is more complex. 
Aggrieved schools may recover the pecuniary loss of the 
benefits of the contract.138  This includes television or 
advertising revenue, loss of ticket sales, and other lost 
income.139  Schools may also recover consequential damages 
for losses that are caused by the interference.140  This may 
include damages caused by NCAA penalties including 
forfeiture of victories and tournament winnings.141  
Significantly, schools are also permitted to recover for actual 
harm to their reputation, as long as the harm was reasonably 
foreseeable as a consequence of the interference.142  While 
actual harm to reputation may be difficult to show, a 
sympathetic court and jury may be willing to accept 
arguments that this damage may not be discernible until 
future dates.  Lastly, and importantly, schools may recover 
punitive damages under appropriate circumstances.143  Thus, 
a school that brings a tortious interference with a contract 
claim against an agent should be able to prove the required 
elements with ease and may be able to recover considerable 
damages, deterring agents from engaging in such conduct 
with that school’s student-athletes in the future. 
 
 136.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). 
 137.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1242. 
 138.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(a). 
 139.  Richard P. Woods & Michael R. Mills, Tortious Interference with an Athletic 
Scholarship: A University’s Remedy for the Unscrupulous Sports Agent, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 
141, 167 (1988-1989). 
 140.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(b). 
 141.  Woods, supra note 139, at 169. 
 142.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(c). 
 143.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A cmt. a. 
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Agent’s Liability to Third Parties Claim 
Generally, an agent only owes duties to their principal,144 
but in certain circumstances the duties owed by an agent 
extend to third parties.  In the context of representation 
contracts between athletes and agents this would mean that 
the only duties owed by the agent are to the athlete.  But, 
when the athlete in that situation is a student-athlete, the 
duties owed by the agent may extend out to the student-
athlete’s school, among others.  Since “an agent who 
fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or 
knowingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud or 
duress by his principal or by others is subject to liability in 
tort to the injured person although the fraud or duress occurs 
in a transaction on behalf of the principal,”145 one can 
definitely make this argument. 
By competing in athletic events for their school, a student-
athlete who is no longer eligible for such competition, by 
virtue of entering into a contract with an agent or receiving 
benefits from an agent, is committing fraud on the school.146  
So, the elements of this tort are easily established.  The 
student-athlete is the principal and the agent is, well, the 
agent.  The principal is committing a fraud by competing 
when they are ineligible.  The agent knows the principal will 
be committing fraud and assists them in it by (1) making 
them ineligible and (2) not notifying the school that the 
student-athlete is no longer eligible.  Therefore, schools 
should bring claims against an agent that provides improper 
benefits to a student-athlete or enters into a representation 
contract with a student-athlete since that agent would likely 
be found liable for fraud. 
Viability of Civil Actions as the Solution to Agent Misconduct 
Clearly, a school’s ability to pursue a civil action against 
an agent that causes the school damage has been established 
through statutes and the common law.  But, the existence of 
 
 144.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13. 
 145.  Id. § 348. 
 146.  Fraud is intentional deception that causes a person or entity to give up 
property or some lawful right.  See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 555 (2d college 
ed. 1984). 
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such a right of action does not mean that it is automatically 
the solution to preventing agents from engaging in improper 
behavior.  This section will consider whether civil action is a 
viable solution to the problem by considering criticisms of it 
and whether universities would actually pursue it as an 
option. 
Criticisms of Civil Actions as the Solution to Agent 
Misconduct 
One criticism of this solution asserts that universities 
make too much money from college sports to undertake 
publicized and damaging lawsuits.147  This criticism cites the 
damaging information that may come out about the schools 
during the discovery process and the belief that universities 
want to keep NCAA violations out of the public eye.148  But, 
this Comment does not contend that schools should sue 
whenever there is an NCAA violation.  Rather, schools should 
sue when the NCAA violations and penalties are severe, such 
as at USC where there is a two-year bowl ban and a three-
year reduction in scholarships.149  When violations like that 
occur, they are already in the public eye and, since the NCAA 
publicizes its findings in relation to the penalties it delivers, 
there is not much that can come out in the discovery process 
that would harm the school any further. 
Another criticism of civil actions as the solution is that 
some agents may be judgment-proof and the agents that 
schools would succeed in bringing claims against are not 
worth the expense of a lawsuit.150  This criticism comes from 
the beliefs that some agents will not be deterred by the risk of 
any possible fine or penalty because the reward of signing a 
superstar athlete is much greater and that the agents that 
would be deterred are not the ones that pose the greatest 
threat to student-athletes and schools, so it is a waste of time 
and resources to pursue claims against them.151  This criticism 
is lacking in both its bases.  First, it ignores the possibility of 
how large a successful claim against an agent may be.  If an 
 
 147.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1245-46. 
 148.  Id. at 1246. 
 149.  Zinser, supra note 3. 
 150.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1246. 
 151.  Id. 
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agent is found fully liable for the damage a school suffers as a 
result of NCAA penalties, the school’s recovery may be in the 
tens of millions of dollars.  As demonstrated above, damages a 
school is entitled to recover under a statutory civil action 
could include “lost television revenues, lost ticket sales from 
regular season athletic events, lost revenues from not 
qualifying for postseason athletic events such as football bowl 
games and NCAA tournaments, and possibly the value of the 
athlete’s scholarship.”152  If you add on to that amount the 
damages a school is entitled to under the common law for 
harm to reputation as well as punitive damages, the 
monetary judgment could be astronomical.  Second, even if a 
particular agent does not possess enough assets to pay off an 
adverse judgment, the deterrent effect of a large damages 
award would not be lessened.  Nevertheless, many of the 
major agents have significant assets and recovery of a 
judgment against those agents would be possible. 
A third criticism of this solution is that bringing a civil 
action would harm the school’s reputation.153  This would 
make it harder to recruit student-athletes because it would be 
a logical choice for a student to choose a school without a 
propensity to sue people who cause NCAA violations.154  
Further, it would dissuade alumni and others from donating 
to the university if the school was being criticized in the 
media.155  This criticism falters for several reasons.  First, this 
solution does not call for schools to sue student-athletes who 
violate NCAA rules; it calls for action against those who 
induce the student-athletes into breaking the rules.  Thus, a 
school choosing to pursue this solution will never harm a 
student-athlete.  Second, this solution envisions every school 
that is harmed by agent misconduct bringing an action 
against those agents.  If a school does not want to pursue such 
an action and chooses not to protect itself, then it does not 
deserve the protection of the law.  Finally, rather than 
dissuade donors, this solution may persuade individuals to 
donate more, or at all.  If an alumnus sees that its school will 
not stand by and let others harm it, then that alumnus may 
 
 152.  Weiler, supra note 56, at 429. 
 153.  Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1246-47. 
 154.  Id. at 1247. 
 155.  Id. 
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be willing to contribute more to help the school’s defense.  
Further, such an action may bring the school community 
together; pitting it against an opponent as if it were a football 
game in November or a basketball game in March, creating a 
surge of pride that would increase donations in both the 
present and future. 
A final criticism of civil actions as a solution is that schools 
may be unable to bring successful claims because of their 
knowledge of the violations.156  After all, the NCAA only 
delivers most serious penalties when a lack of institutional 
control on the part of the school is present along with the 
violations.157  Paul Haagen, co-director of Duke University’s 
Center for Sports Law and Policy, has said, “You're going to 
have this question about whether the harm was caused by the 
action or by the failure of the institution effectively to control 
… There would be a contributory negligence kind of thing 
there.  That would be a difficulty.”158  While this criticism 
would be valid if the solution of schools bringing civil actions 
relied upon the recovery of full damages, it overlooks the fact 
that it is unnecessary for a school to recover all of its damages 
to be successful.  Once a school has been hit with NCAA 
penalties it has two choices: (1) take the penalty and suffer all 
the damage, or (2) take the penalty and receive some relief 
from the agent who caused the penalty.  Even if a school’s 
penalty would result in $10 million in damages and they 
would only have a true recovery of one dollar from the 
agent,159 they are still clearly better off financially.  Further, 
the suit would still accomplish the goal of sending a message 
to agents that the school will not tolerate interference with its 
student-athletes and deter agents from engaging in improper 
conduct at that school in the future.  Therefore, the civil 
action would still be successful even if the school were unable 
to recover the full amount of its damages. 
Schools Would Consider Civil Actions as a Viable Option 
There are only two ways to know if schools would consider 
 
 156.  Id. at 1248. 
 157.  Ken Tysiac, N.C. State’s Yow warns agents, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 
2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/06/616770/yow-warns-agents.html.  
 158.  Id. 
 159.  True recovery equaling the full amount of the award less all costs. 
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civil actions against agents who cause the school harm as a 
viable option: (1) schools have done it in the past, or (2) 
schools have said they will do it in the future.  There have 
been instances of both of these possibilities.  First, USC filed 
a civil action against Caron when it suffered NCAA penalties 
in 1995.160  This was one of the first instances of a school 
pursuing an action against an agent and,161 while it has not 
become a popular option, demonstrates that in the right 
circumstances schools will pursue civil actions against agents.  
Second, Debbie Yow (“Yow”), the athletic director at North 
Carolina State University (“N.C. State”), has said that if 
agents break any laws while recruiting N.C. State student-
athletes, the university will take action against the agents.162  
Yow has sent a letter to all registered agents in North 
Carolina stating as much, something she also did when she 
was the athletic director at the University of Maryland.163  
Thus, while the opportunity to pursue a civil action against 
an agent has not arisen for her, Yow has made it clear to the 
agents in two states that improper conduct will not be 
tolerated and that she is willing to pursue civil actions to 
protect her university.  Finally, Mike Garrett (“Garrett”), 
former athletic director of USC, has stated his support for 
civil actions against agents that interfere with student-
athletes.164  Garrett has suggested that the NCAA institute a 
tax on its members to fund mandatory civil actions against 
such agents and stated that the benefits of this solution 
include not only the recovery of damages, but also the access 
to information the NCAA would gain through court 
proceedings.165  Clearly, this demonstrates that civil actions 
against agents that cause schools harm is a viable option for 
schools to prevent agents from inducing their student-athletes 
into breaking NCAA rules. 
 
 160.  Almond, supra note 54. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Tysiac, supra note 157. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Mike Garrett, How to Keep Agents Off the Field, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/opinion/30garrett.html?_r=1.  
 165. Id.  
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Other Parties that may have Causes of Actions Against Agents 
In addition to the civil actions that schools may bring 
against agents that cause the schools damage, there are other 
parties that may also have claims against those agents, which 
could serve as supplements to the civil actions brought by 
schools.  Outside of the obvious possibility of the student-
athlete bringing an action against an agent,166 other parties 
that may have claims include other student-athletes at the 
school, coaches at the school, alumni and fans of the school, 
and other sports agents.  One possibility is for these parties to 
bring a statutory action against the agent.  While SPARTA 
and the UAAA do not provide for actions by other parties, 
instead focusing on actions by the schools,167 the Miller-Ayala 
Act states that, in addition to athletes and schools, any other 
person who is adversely affected by acts of an agent that are 
in violation of the Miller-Ayala Act may bring a civil action to 
recover their damages.168  Alternatively, if a person resides in 
a state that does not have a statutory right of action, they 
may bring a civil action under the common law, possibly 
claiming that the agent breached a duty owed to them by 
virtue of the agent’s actions creating the risk of harm.169  In 
either scenario, such a case would likely turn on the ability of 
the plaintiff to establish damages. 
Other Student-Athletes’ Claims Against Agents 
Other student-athletes at schools harmed by agents, 
especially returning players on the team penalized by the 
NCAA, are left to pay the price for the mistakes of their 
 
 166.  Athletes are able to bring actions against their agents through both contract 
and tort law, as with any other agency relationship. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 
16 cmt.  Usually, these actions arise in situations involving financial mistakes. See Liz 
Mullen, Judge orders Jones to pay Dishman $550K, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 3, 2002, 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/29021; Pippen wins $11 million lawsuit 
against financial advisor, CBS BUS. NETWORK, Dec. 20, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_m1355/is_25_106/ai_n8694084/.  But, while possible, there has not been a 
claim brought by an athlete against an agent on the basis of the agent’s actions causing 
the athlete loss of NCAA eligibility. 
 167.  15 U.S.C. § 7805; UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16. 
 168.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.8(a). 
 169.  An actor is negligent with respect to another if his conduct creates a 
recognizable risk of harm to the other individually, or as a member of a class of persons. 
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 281 cmt. on Clause (b). 
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former teammates and are harmed by the NCAA rules 
violations of agents in various ways.  First, if there is a 
scholarship reduction, then there are fewer players on the 
team.  This increases the amount of playing and practice time 
per player and makes players more susceptible to fatigue and 
injuries, possibly reducing or ending players’ careers.  This is 
why USC did not have any contact in their preseason 
practices in 2010.170  Second, if the school is prohibited from 
playing in bowl games, then the players have less opportunity 
to practice and play games to increase their experience and 
skills and to showcase their talents in front of nationwide 
audiences.171  Finally, if the school is hit with serious 
penalties by the NCAA, such as a reduction in television time 
or scholarships, it will likely make the team less successful,172 
which would decrease the number of professional scouts at 
the games and also prevent students from competing on 
television, which further decreases their opportunity to be 
discovered.  Therefore, these student-athletes definitely suffer 
damages as a result of an agent’s NCAA rules violations and, 
if they are able to establish a concrete dollar amount, would 
likely be able to recover against such an agent. 
Coaches’ Claims Against Agents 
Coaches are also harmed by the NCAA rules violations of 
agents in a variety of ways.  First, the coach may be fired 
from his position at the school as a result of the NCAA 
 
 170.  See Lane Kiffin: no more tackling, ESPN, Aug. 12, 2010, http://espn.go.com/ 
blog/los-angeles/usc/post/_/id/2705/lane-kiffin-no-more-tackling; Josh Jovanelly, Practice 
isn’t the fix for USC’s tackling woes, DAILY TROJAN, Oct. 4, 2010, http://dailytrojan.com/ 
2010/10/04/practice-isn%E2%80%99t-the-fix-for-usc%E2%80%99s-tackling-woes/ 
(“Sanctions equal fewer players, which means a team that has less tolerance for injuries 
that don’t happen on game day.”). 
 171.  Some coaches place importance on qualifying for bowl games just for the 
additional fifteen practices it permits, enabling the coaches to further develop their 
players. See Erick Smith, Notre Dame coach Brian Kelly wants Irish in a bowl game, 
any bowl game, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
campusrivalry/post/2010/10/notre-dame-coach-brian-kelly-wants-irish-in-a-bowl-game-
any-bowl-game/1. 
 172.  After receiving NCAA discipline similar to that given to USC, in the five years 
after bowl bans were lifted Alabama’s record was 21-14, Auburn University’s record 
was 18-22, and the University of Oklahoma’s record was 17-15-2.  Rosenfield, supra 
note 3. 
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violations.173  Second, if the coach keeps his job, it will tarnish 
his reputation, making it harder for him to attain 
employment in the future and also to recruit student-athletes 
at the present time.174  Finally, if the school is required to 
decrease its scholarships, then it will make it much harder for 
the coach to perform his job and will likely result in 
unsuccessful seasons.175  This lack of success could also lead to 
the coach’s firing and make it harder for them to attain 
employment in the future.  Thus, while it may be difficult to 
quantify the amount of harm, it is inarguable that coaches are 
harmed by the NCAA rules violations of agents. 
Alumni and Fans’ Claims Against Agents 
Alumni are harmed by the NCAA rules violations of 
agents because such violations tarnish the name and 
reputation of their school.  This may decrease the value of 
their education in the public’s eye and make it harder for 
them to network or attain employment.  Additionally, fans are 
harmed by the NCAA rules violations of agents because if 
those violations result in postseason or television bans, it will 
present fans fewer opportunities to watch their school’s team.  
Moreover, if the rules violation is severe and the NCAA 
delivers it dreaded “death penalty,”176 it will deprive fans of 
 
 173.  It is common for schools to include termination for cause provisions in their 
coaches’ contracts, enabling them to terminate the coach’s employment if their program 
is found guilty of a major NCAA rules violation. See Adam Rittenberg, RichRod gets 
win, still needs more on field, ESPN, Nov. 4, 2010, http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/ 
post/_/id/19154/richrod-gets-win-still-needs-more-on-field.  
 174.  Following the NCAA’s announcement of USC’s penalties, USC lost its 
commitment from one of the top high school offensive linemen in the country. See AP: 
Seantrel Henderson chooses to play for Miami, USA TODAY, July 13, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-07-09-henderson-
miami_N.htm.  
 175.  See supra note 172. 
 176.  “The ‘death penalty’ is a phrase used by media to describe the most serious 
NCAA penalties possible.  It is not a formal NCAA term.  It applies only to repeat 
violators and can include eliminating the involved sport for at least one year, the 
elimination of athletics aid in that sport for two years and the school relinquishing its 
Association voting privileges for a four-year period.  A school is a repeat violator if a 
second major violation occurs within five years of the start date of the penalty from the 
first case. The cases do not have to be in the same sport.” Glossary of terms, NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ 
NCAA/Issues/Enforcement/Rules+Enforcement+glossary+of+terms. Southern 
Methodist University is the only school to receive the full extent of the NCAA’s death 
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any opportunity to watch their school’s team.  Lastly, if the 
fan is a season ticket holder, it may cause a diminution in 
value to their investment, thus presenting a tangible, 
financial harm.  Consequently, claims by fans and alumni 
against agents may have the best chance of success, especially 
if they are ticket holders, because they are the easiest in 
which to identify a quantifiable amount of damages. 
Other Agents’ Claims Against Agents 
Other agents are harmed by the NCAA rules violations of 
agents because those violations create a negative public 
perception of the entire sports agent industry.177  This may 
make it harder for them to attract clients, especially at 
schools that have already been harmed by agents.178  Further, 
if they are part of the same firm or agency as an agent that 
has violated NCAA rules, it may make it harder for them to 
attract clients because they may be seen as unethical or 
untrustworthy to potential clients, essentially as guilty by 
association.  Additionally, competing agents may be able to 
bring a claim for unfair competition against agents that 
violate NCAA rules.  If an agent is losing out on clients 
because they are following the rules while others are not, then 
there is certainly tangible harm.  But, despite the possibility 
of easily establishing damages, agents are reluctant to bring 
civil actions, or even file grievances with players associations, 
against other agents.179  Thus, while agents could be 
successful in actions against agents who violate NCAA rules, 
the probability of such actions being initiated is not currently 
 
penalty and its football team did not recover for over twenty years. See generally David 
Williams, Overcoming the NCAA Death Penalty: Southern Methodist, 21 Years Later, 
BLEACHER REPORT, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/16678-overcoming-the-ncaa-
death-penalty-southern-methodist-21-years-later.  
 177.  “Like serpents they infest the gardens and groves of American sport, poised to 
strike at the wealth professional athletes earn in such plenty. This, anyway, is the 
popular perception of sports agents, and it’s a generalization based on a great many 
sordid and all-too-true particulars.” Craig Neff, Den of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad 
Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/ 
article/magazine/MAG1066585/index.htm.  
 178.  For example, agents are no longer allowed to attend practices at USC following 
the penalties the NCAA delivered. See Marcia C. Smith, New feeling at USC practice: 
Keep out, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ 
practice-260770-usc-field.html.  
 179.  See Davis, supra note 6, at 805. 
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high. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is near-universal consensus that something 
needs to be done to dissuade agents from violating NCAA 
rules and, consequently, causing damage to student-athletes 
and schools, there is not even near a plurality opinion on 
what that action should be.  More regulation, elimination of 
the NCAA’s amateurism requirement, and regulation by 
players associations have all been proffered as options, but 
they are either inherently flawed or impractical.  The debate 
about the way forward assumes that we have already 
exhausted available options.  That is simply not true.  The 
solution to the problem should utilize the existing statutory 
and common law framework, making civil actions by schools 
against agents that cause those schools damage the best 
solution.  In addition to allowing schools to recover some, if 
not all, of their damages, civil actions will serve as a major 
deterrent for improper agent conduct.  If an agent knows that 
they may be held liable for tens of millions of dollars, then the 
risk will finally outweigh the reward of signing a superstar 
athlete and it will no longer make economic sense for agents 
to break NCAA rules to sign athletes.  Moreover, this 
deterrent does not disappear in cases where agents will not be 
held liable for such large amounts.  If a school brings a civil 
action against an agent and that agent is found liable, then 
even if the amount of damages awarded is minimal, such a 
finding would likely lead to punishment from players 
associations, resulting in the removal of the unscrupulous 
agent from the marketplace.180  Therefore, civil actions by 
schools against agents who cause those schools damage is 
clearly the best solution because it provides relief to schools 
for past harms by such agents and dissuades agents from 
violating NCAA rules, at that school and others, in the future.  
Lastly, these tools have the advantage of existing already; 
they do not impose high costs for creation, development, or 
 
 180.  The NFLPA decertified Luchs for admitting he violated NCAA rules to sign 
athletes. See NFLPA decertifies Josh Luchs, supra note 110.  Thus, since such an 
admission leads to penalties from players associations, a finding by a court that an 
agent violated NCAA rules and caused damage to student-athletes and schools would 
also likely result in decertification or, at a minimum, suspension. 
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implementation. 
 
